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Commercial Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) applications continue to 
experience widespread growth since the first commercial UAS flight in 2014 
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2014). Current research indicates the 
industry will be worth over six billion USD by 2022 (Grand View Research, 2016). 
Despite this growth, two significant challenges face UAS operators: systematic and 
reliable identification of hazards in specific operations and achieving a sustainable 
return on investment. The two challenges are codependent: loss prevention supports 
increased return on investment, and total safety increases productivity reputation 
and operational efficiency (Stolzer et al., 2011). Safety performance is challenging 
to measure, and it depends upon what does not happen rather than what happens 
(Stoop & Deckker, 2012). 
The best safety management programs are predictive and practical in their 
application exposing the warning signs of accidents, known as 'leading indicators' 
(Levenson, 2015; Silver, 2012). However, finding these warning signs is 
challenging due to the diverse concepts of operations (CONOPS), the dynamic 
nature of remote teaming, and increasingly opaque automation functions. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to test the application of several accepted 
methods and taxonomies to build a Quantum Safety Metrics framework that could 
be applied to small commercial UAS. These methods included the 'Sierra Scale' 
and 'Accident Prevention Effort' (APE) equation as described in Stolzer et al. 
(2011), the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) as defined 
by Levenson (2004), and the Human Factors Accident Classification System 
(HFACS) as defined by (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
Each of these methods was used by leveraging the strengths of each 
technique. For example, HFACs was used first to identify and classify human 
factors; STAMP was used to visualize the non-linear accident pathways and 
organize unsafe acts and themes. The APE and Sierra Scale were used to quantify 
the value of two novel efforts (effort at the accident and benchmark effort). For this 
study, small commercial unmanned aircraft systems are defined as weighing less 
than 55 pounds maximum take-off weight, they use commercial off-the-shelf' 
technology (COTs), and they are used for commercial purposes. 
 
Problem 
Two significant challenges face UAS operators: systematic and reliable 
identification of hazards in specific operations and achieving a sustainable 
investment return. Even small accidents represent significant erosion of profit 
margins and operational efficiency. There is no practical method to predict and 
quantify benchmark safety performance. An accident's warning signals are often 
hard to see, even for experienced safety professionals (Levenson, 2015; Silver, 
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2012; Stolzer et al., 2011). There is also a gap between traditional aviation safety 
information and UAS operations. New entrants to the UAS industry may find it 
challenging to apply conventional aviation safety concepts to diverse and dynamic 
UAS CONOPS.  
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This study asked three central research questions about the application of 
the HFACS, STAMP, The Sierra Scale, and APE in investigating UAS accidents:    
1. How practical is the application of the three methods in identifying leading 
indicators from UAS accident reports? 
Ha1: The application of the three methods in identifying leading indicators from 
UAS accident reports is practical. 
2. Can the leading indicators determine a benchmark level of accident prevention 
by this new combined method? 
Ha2. The leading indicators can be used to determine a benchmark level of 
accident prevention by this new combined method. 
3. Is it possible to determine and calculate the value of leading indicators for 
accident prevention effort from this new quantum framework? 
Ha3. The new quantum framework makes it possible to determine the value of 
leading indicators for accident prevention effort. 
 
Literature Review 
UASs are diverse in their application and offer considerable benefits and 
costs savings to organizations and the communities they serve, including 
humanitarian aid, search and rescue, utility inspection and repair, and disaster relief 
(Chowdhury et al., 2017; Lamb, 2019; Wargo et al. 2014). In 2016, the U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced the long-awaited commercial UAS 
operators' certificate, CFR 14, §107. Part 107 provides a faster and significantly 
less rigorous process to operate commercial UAS than its predecessor, the CFR 14 
§ 333 exemption, which was on a case-by-case basis. The new Part 107 certification 
allows an operator to fly a UAS for commercial purposes with some restrictions 
including that it must weigh less than 55 pounds, be flown within visual line of 
sight, and remain below 400 feet above ground level.  
The Part 107 certification requires applicants to answer a set of knowledge 
questions, provide identification, and submit and pay for their application. 
However, the rules do not require a flight test to confirm competency or offer any 
evidence of safety and risk management precautions, enabling a low entry barrier 
into the commercial UAS market. The low entry barrier is favorable for the UAS 
industry as it supports: a) the ease of gaining commercial certification, b) the high 
value the UAS offers, and c) the affordability and accessibility of the platform. 
2





Many operators may find it challenging to apply conventional aviation 
safety resources to the very diverse UAS environment. An operating environment 
is defined by MITRE as a user-oriented document that:  
describes systems characteristics for a proposed system from a user's 
perspective. A CONOPS also describes the user organization, mission, and 
objectives from an integrated systems point of view and is used to 
communicate overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to 
stakeholders. (2020, Concept of Operations section) 
 
Predictive Hazard Identification and Leading Indicators 
Cost implications of even minor accidents and incidents can be complicated 
and can include negligible direct costs to high indirect costs, including loss of 
reputation and high-value contracts (Friend & Kohn, 2018; Hollnagel et al., 
2006; Reason, 2016; Stolzer et al., 2011). Usually, accidents are preceded by 
warning signs, or 'leading,’ however, these leading indicators must complete many 
other operational signals and more obvious safety threats, which can be recognized 
by the human operator.  
The human operator must determine safety performance by what does not 
happen rather than what does; therefore, quantifying safety performance is a 
challenge (Friend & Kohn, 2018; Hollnagel, et al., 2006; Reason, 2016; Stolzer et 
al., 2011; Stoop & Dekker, 2012). Prominent warning signs are usually ones that 
you can see; for example, a broken propeller or a trip hazard is more readily 
apparent than a missing procedure or lapsed software update (Leveson, 2015; 
Silver, 2012).  
A Leading Indicator has been defined as "a warning sign that can be used 
in monitoring a safety-critical process to detect when a safety-related assumption 
is broken or dangerously weak and that action is required to prevent an accident" 
(Levenson, 2015, p. 20). Leading indicators may be measured by actions, 
behaviors, and processes (Blair & O'Toole, 2010). They can be categorized into 
four areas: flexibility, opacity, just culture, and management commitment (Stolzer 
et al., 2011; Wreathall, 1998). Therefore, identifying the 'missing' clues from the 
obvious is what safety engineers may describe as the essence of predictive hazard 
identification - preventing an accident before it happens (Leveson, 2015). 
Safety Management Systems' central function is hazard identification and 
safety assurance function (FAA, 2015; Stolzer et al., 2011). While closely 
interrelated, both rely on mechanisms such as audits, self-reporting systems, 
operational data analysis, anonymous reporting, and other formal and informal 
means. Many organizations identify hazards retrospectively, and traditional hazard 
identification techniques use rearward-facing data analyses derived from 
operational observations primarily from past events. Predictive safety programs 
focus on systems within systems, and interactions, identifying leading indicators of 
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events based on potential (Levenson, 2015; Stolzer et al., 2011). The optimum 
safety performance is achieved with a mix of predictive and reactive safety hazard 
identification methods that cope with the unexpected in a diverse operational 
environment.  
The Concept of Resilience in Safety 
Resilience in safety emphasizes proactive "living" and "elastic" processes 
that can cope with surprise and unexpected events, rather than traditional reactive 
defenses (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Achieving resilient operations begins with 
understanding complexity by creating new attitudes and processes that are 'failure 
sensitive' and that adapt to commercial pressures even with fiscal constraints 
(Woods & Cook, 2002). Resilience means recognizing the non-linear potentiality 
of the hazard and absorbing or deflecting its impact so that operations continue with 
minimal disruption. 
The Concept of Quantum Metrics in Safety 
Hazards are 'potentialities' for unsafe outcomes that may 'flow' along either 
linear or non-linear pathways. Unsafe outcomes can manifest from interactions 
between key actors, including software, hardware, the environment, and 'liveware' 
or human interfaces (ICAO, 2009). Although not a mainstream concept in aviation 
safety, these potentialities follow quantum principles in complex dynamic systems 
where some interactions are undetectable or hidden from the human senses (Brown, 
2006; Susskind & Friedman, 2014). Quantum principles are not discussed in 
traditional aviation risk management; however, these principles have been 
compared to systems in the arts, music, and social sciences – some would suggest 
observed life in general (Fischer, 2010; Shimony, 1963).  
The Sierra Scale in Safety  
The ‘Sierra Scale’ is a positive enabler to guide identifying the leading 
safety assurance indicators to enable a predictive response to the ever-changing 
operational environment (Stolzer et al., 2011). The Serra Scale involves assigning 
a numerical value to each organization's safety programs, initiatives, awards, and 
other safety efforts. Each of these programs' value is added together to arrive at a 
cumulative value that describes the organization's total accident prevent effort 
(APE). The APE defines the numerical values assigned to each safety initiative, 
which may be tailored specifically to the organization's size, complexity, and safety 
needs (Stolzer et al., 2011).  
For this study, applying the Sierra Scale to arrive at a total Accident 
Prevention Effort is part of developing a Quantum Safety Program (QSP); this can 
be a valuable metric when monitored and maintained within the safety assurance 
function of an SMS. In conjunction with resilience methodologies, QSPs support 
the central tenant of identifying potentialities. When complex systems fail, the 
people, preferably appropriately trained, can adapt to disturbances within the 
system and cope with unexpected occurrences (Hollnagel, 1983; Hollnagel et al., 
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2006). This study adopts the APE for programs to measure Accident Prevention 
Effort for Risk (APE-R) assessment of unsafe control actions.  
The Fuzzy-Logic Risk Matrix  
This current study used an adapted 'fuzzy logic' risk matrix based on the 
Hazards Effects Management Process (HEMP) (Ahn & Chang, 2016; Yazdi, 2018) 
to arrive at the APE-R. The benefit of using this type of risk matrix is that 
subjectivity during the risk assessment process is reduced. The elements of a risk 
matrix are composed of the individual cells (the risk indices), which are the 
likelihood of adverse event occurrence and the severity of consequences caused by 
this particular event, and the color codes associated with those cells (FAA, 2017; 
Skorupski, 2016; Stolzer et al., 2011). The framework in the Appendix of this 
current study contains the risk matrix used for the analysis. 
Human Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS)  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was 
developed for the US Navy and Marine Corps as an accident investigation and data 
analysis tool (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The HFACS methodology has also 
been applied to commercial aviation accident investigations (Shappell et al., 2007). 
HFACS is a theoretically-based tool specifically developed to define the latent and 
active failures implicated in Reason's "Swiss cheese" model to investigate and 
analyze human error associated with accidents and incidents (Shappell et al., 2007; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
HFACS describes four levels of failure, each of which corresponds to 
Reason's model's four layers. These include: 1) organizational influences, 2) unsafe 
supervision (i.e., middle management), 3) preconditions for unsafe acts, and 4) the 
unsafe acts of operators (e.g., aircrew, maintainers, air traffic controllers). Within 
the context of this study, the HFACS was used to help classify the unsafe control 
actions into unsafe control themes. 
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) 
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) is a systems 
engineering approach to safety analysis. The use of STAMP offers advantages over 
other linear safety investigation models; these include: 1) examining the role of 
systemic feedback and responses, 2) examining organizational constraints and 
socio-technical constraints at various levels, and 3) improving the safety of the 
overall system while seeking to identify leading indicators (Allison et al., 2017). 
Through the STAMP methodology, process accidents occur due to inadequate 
control of constraints on safety behaviors and processes (Levenson, 2004). UAS 
operations involve socio-technical systems with complex linear and non-linear 
interactions and control and feedback (Levenson, 2004). STAMP has been used in 
aviation safety studies to uncover critical insights into system safety. It may assist 
in identifying safety issues arising from: (1) component failures, (2) dysfunctional 
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interactions among components, and (3) environmental disturbances (Allison et al., 
2017; Levenson, 2004).  
Interpreting accident data may be subjective: operators, managers, 
engineers, and regulatory agencies have a differing perspective of underlying 
contributing and causal factors leading to an accident (Levenson, 2004); therefore, 
a recognized model for consistently identifying leading indicators by UAS 
operators is imperative. STAMP uses four main concepts, which are interrelated 
and dynamic; they are described as a) constraints, b) control loops, c) process 
models, and d) levels of control.  
STAMP Constraints. Constraints are 'mechanisms' that control or modify 
behaviors to block hazards; for example, a password to allow computer access is a 
safety constraint that prevents unauthorized use. The STAMP framework offers a 
method to identify what and where constraints are required and then build them into 
the appropriate locations with the overall system design. The STAMP framework 
describes the rationale for the application of constraints as a "...lack of appropriate 
constraints necessary to ensure system behavior… constraints are the most basic 
concept in STAMP and are emphasized more so than safety events" (Levenson, 
2004, pp.252, 254).  
Control Loops and Process Models. Control loops and process models in STAMP 
relates to three main areas: a) the human controllers (pilots and operators), b) the 
automated controllers (the autopilot and automated systems) and, c) the interaction 
and feedback that the systems provide to both. The primary purpose of control loops 
and process models in STAMP is to support the human supervisory role. Functions 
include interacting with displays, controls, alarms, and pop-up windows on 
software. Influences that affect the human supervisory role, such as ‘Socio-
technical levels of control,’ include elements of regulations, standards, and 
protocols that 'constrain’ the risk in relationships; for example, organizational 
hierarchy, communication, and stakeholders' relation (Hollnagel et al., 2006). This 
current study used the STAMP framework to visualize linear and non-linear safety 
vectors from interactions between software, hardware, environment, and liveware 
[human interfaces] (ICAO, 2009; Leveson, 2015).  
 
Methodology 
This study used mixed-method, non-experimental research with a parallel 
convergence approach using multiple instrumental [multiple case study] and 
exemplar case study design (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Edmonds & Kenedy, 
2017). The study examined N = 100 commercial UAS accident reports collected 
from several online databases, including the NASA Accident and Incident 
Reporting System and Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). A sample 
frame of n = 22 commercial UAS accidents was used to build the risk categories 
and one exemplar case study was used to test the APE-R method.  
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The study's qualitative part was non-experimental research with a narrative 
perspective and multiple case study design (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Edmonds 
& Kennedy, 2017) to support a thematic analysis from the accident narratives. 
Concurrently, the researchers used a constant comparison method to support the 
findings' generalizability (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The thematic analysis examined contributing causal factors of the accidents using 
the HFACS themes to assign the most appropriate unsafe control action (UCA) 
label and classifying each UCA into a suitable Unsafe Control Action Theme 
(UCAT). Therefore, each accident report analyzed: (1) causal factors, (2) HFACS 
themes, (3) UCA name, (4) UCA Value, and (5) UCAT theme value. Fourteen 
themes emerged from the thematic analysis. The database is located in Appendix 
B.  
Quantitative Risk Assessment Using APE & Sierra Scale 
A 'fuzzy-logic' risk matrix was used to assign a risk value of each UCA 
systematically and cumulatively for each UCAT. This was used as the Qualifying 
Effect (QE) inserted into the Sierra Scale equation to determine an Accident 
Prevention Effort (APE). This method was based on the Sierra Scale to calculate 
APE for safety programs in Stolzer et al. (2011). 
Therefore, UCA Risk Value x Frequency of Occurrence = QE, the sum of 
the QEs in each UCAT = the APE-R. 
There is a critical difference between the APE for safety programs (APE-P) 
and the APE for UCAs (APE-R). A high APE in programs is desirable, indicating 
positive accident prevention effort, while the opposite is true for UCAs, 
representing the risk; therefore, a high APE-R means a high risk. Considering the 
dichotomy of a desirable high APE-P, the APE for safety programs must be 
analyzed separately to the APE for Unsafe Control Acts [risk] compared to a low 
APE-R.  
Results and Findings 
Thematic analysis of n = 22 UAS accidents revealed Fourteen Unsafe 
Control Action Themes (UCATs) with risk values ranging from 25 (most risk) to 6 
(least risk). The theme occurrence frequency ranged from 12 to 2; 'inadequate use 
of checklist' was the theme with this highest risk value and second highest 
frequency. The UCAT was assigned a risk value and entered into the table of 
UCATs presented in Figure 1.  
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Unsafe Control Action Themes (UCAT) N= 22 accidents 
 
The next step in the parallel-convergent approach was to apply the UCAT 
themes risk value to the exemplar case study and visualize risk 'potentialities' using 
the STAMP UAS CONOPS to quantify the risk values.  
Exemplar Case Study (n = 1) 
On September 27, 2016, on the New South Wales Coast of Australia, a 
Pulse Aerospace Vapor 55 lost communication and control (C2) signal with the 
ground control station and continued to fly un-commanded through busy flight 
training airspace with a trajectory into controlled airspace. The incorrect 
georeferenced point was programmed into the ground control station (northern 
hemisphere instead of the southern hemisphere). The aircraft was never recovered 
and it is likely that it impacted the ocean to the northern hemisphere reference point. 

















0 5 10 15 20 25 30
2.    Inadequate organizational procedures…
6.    Lost C2 link
1.    Inadequate/Untested software
7.    Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test
3.    Lack of total system testing
13.      Inexperience in operational area
4.    Distracted/"Screen Bound" Remote Pilot
5.    Inadequate Data entry
14.      Inadequate Visual observer
8.    Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control…
9.    Inadequate Checklist application
10.      Inadequate organizational procedures…
11.      Inadequate organizational procedures…
12.      Inadequate Checklist
USC Theme Occurance Freqency and Risk Value
Risk Value Frequency
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Quantum Safety Vectors: In the Exemplar Case Study 
 
 
Note. Diagram adapted from Allison et al. (2017).  
 
Discussion 
Typically, mixed methods will present findings and discussions in an 
integrated format. As this study progressed, it was determined that an integrated 
discussion of the finding was appropriate (APA, 2020).  
Hazard Vectors 
The regulator is arguably one of the aviation industry's central components, 
providing the baseline framework for certification of aircraft components, airspace 
classification, operating organizations, and individual pilots. Quantum safety 
interactions and safety control pathways can be connected to every aspect of the 
operation, along multiple vectors; for example, a) lack of regulation, b) ineffective 
regulation, c) misapplied regulation, d) lack of oversight or governance, e) 
insufficient resources, f) relevant and appropriate guidance safety guidance, and g) 
inadequate infrastructure (e.g., standardized and practical accident, incident 
reporting protocols). 
Operator Vectors 
Safety controls and constraints are often outlined in the organization's 
policies and procedures, including the more granular Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and training programs that ensure all crew members' 
competency. The organization's top-level management plays a crucial role in 
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operating safely. Operators require a formal safety management system that 
includes essential components of safety assurance and quality processes. 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Vectors.  
The OEM often provides foundational guidance and training, which the 
organizations usually adapt for their specific CONOPS. Deficiencies in the safety 
control interactions between the OEM and the operator has been a causal factor in 
some UAS accidents, as cited in our exemplar case study. Therefore, the safety 
controls between OEM and operator need to be transparent, flexible, and robust. 
Remote Pilots Vectors 
The remote pilots are the front-line defense against an accident; however, 
as data indicates, the remote pilot's safety controls interact with almost every part 
of the system – the regulator, the OEM, the aircraft, the airspace, the organization, 
and even the other airspace users. The CONOPS map indicates that while the 
remote pilots are at the forefront of the operation, they require robust safety 
constraints from all other aspects within and outside the CONOPS system. Table 1 
presents the total calculated value of the accident prevention effort using the Serra 
Scale for the exemplar case study at the time of the accident. 
Table 1  
Exemplar Case Study: Using the Sierra Scale to Determine APE-Risk at the time of 
the accident.  
 








1.    Inadequate/untested software 1 8 8 
2.    Inadequate organizational procedures (maintenance) 1 6 6 
3.    Lack of total system testing   10 0 
4.    Distracted/" screen bound" remote pilot   15 0 
5.    Inadequate Data entry 1 15 15 
6.    Lost C2 link 2 6 12 
7.    Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test 1 9 9 
8.    Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control surface) 
testing 
  16 0 
9.    Inadequate checklist application 2 20 40 
10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training all crew)  7 20 140 
11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight) 7 20 140 
12. Inadequate checklist 2 25 50 
13. Inexperience in the operational area 3 10 30 
14. Inadequate visual observer   15 0 
Total Accident Safety Effort (APE-R) at the time of the 
accident       450 
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Practical Application of APE in Exemplar Case Study.  
The total APE-R calculated in the case study was 450 (sum of the 
Qualifying Effects (QEs); however, this was a pre-accident value and did not 
consider any active safety 'programs' such as APE-P. An example of a total APE-P 
is the sum of Safety Programs and Quantifiable Effect expressed as: (P x QE) = 
APE-P. The case study narrative did not detail any safety programs; therefore, only 
APE-R was assessed. An example of APE-P has been reproduced from Stolzer et 
al. (2011) is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Accident Prevention Effort-Programs (APE-P) 
Programs QE 
Active risk management program 3 
Monthly newsletter 2 
Established safety council  3 
Total APE for Programs (APE-P) 8 
Note. Table adapted from Stolzer et al. (2011). High APE-P is desirable, representing increased 
efforts for accident prevention by safety awareness.  
 
Benchmarking Accident Prevention Effort-Risk (APE-R) 
Benchmarking relies on the STAMP CONOPS to visualize the potentialities 
of hidden hazards and support preventative safety controls. Controls are then 
planned for implementation to calculate the APE-R's value. This new value is used 
as a benchmark, against which various target safety levels could be applied 
depending on the specific CONOPS.  
The new APE value is designated the APE-Risk Benchmark Value (APE-
RBV); the pre-accident APE will be designated APE-Accident Value (APE-AV). The 
APE-RBV would be the minimum benchmark value for maintaining safety and risk 
management programs. Further research is recommended to confirm the 
benchmark APE-RBV values, which would be different in every UAS CONOPS. 
For example, UAS operators who work around electrical conductors [higher risk] 
may choose to maintain their APE-R below the benchmark by a determined value, 
these may be expressed as percentage confidence intervals, or monitoring other 
metrics such as standard deviations of specific safety performance parameters. 
Benchmarking APE-RBV for the Exemplar Case Study. 
UCATs examined in the case study represent the APE-R at the time of the 
accident and is designated APE-RAV (Accident Value) versus the proposed 
benchmark APE-RBV.(Benchmark Value). The benchmark APE is the calculated 
value when all reasonable safety precautions and initiatives are implemented using 
the STAMP UAS CONOPS. Table 3 presents the comparison of the APE value at 
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the time of the accident and the calculated value of the benchmark APE, 
representing the level of accident prevention effort that will likely be required for 
the effective prevention of accidents and incidents. 
 
Table 3 
UCATs Exemplar Case Study at Time of Accident APE-RAV vs. Benchmark APE-
RBV 










1.    Inadequate/untested software 1 8 8 0 
2.    Inadequate organizational procedures 
(maintenance) 
1 6 6 
3 
3.    Lack of total system testing   10 0 0 
4.    Distracted/" screen bound" remote pilot   15 0 0 
5.    Inadequate Data entry 1 15 15 8 
6.    Lost C2 link 2 6 12 8 
7.    Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test 1 9 9 4 
8.    Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control 
surface) testing 
  16 0 
0 
9.    Inadequate checklist application 2 20 40 18 
10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training 
all crew/CRM)  
7 20 140 
18 
11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight) 7 20 140 32 
12. Inadequate checklist 2 25 50 50 
13. Inexperience in the operational area 3 10 30 27 
14. Inadequate visual observer   15 0 0 
APE-R at accident and benchmark value      450AV 168BV 
 
It can be useful to examine the quantifiable effect at the time of the accident 
and then compare this to an optimum Quantifiable Effect (QE). The optimum level 
would represent a robust approach to hazard identification and risk management. 
This study managed to answer all three research questions demonstrating 
that a) the HFACS was useful to categorize human error risk factors, b) the STAMP 
methodology was useful for visualizing risk vectors and therefore leading 
indicators in a specific UAS CONOPS, and c) the basic Accident Prevention Effort 
and Sierra Scale equations could be extended to calculate and quantify leading 
indicators and establish benchmark values for a quantum safety metric program.  
The null hypotheses were rejected, the alternate hypothesis are restated: 
Ha1: The application of the three methods in identifying leading indicators 
from UAS accident reports is practical. 
12





Ha2. The leading indicators can be used to determine a benchmark level of 
accident prevention by this new combined method. 
Ha3. The new quantum framework makes it possible to determine the value 
of leading indicators for accident prevention effort. 
Limitations 
Many UAS accident reports have limited, vague, or ambiguous narratives, 
hindering the discovery of possible contributory and causal factors. The qualitative 
component of the mixed methods research includes limitations that may be 
influenced by the researchers' experiences and subjectivity when interpreting 
qualitative data (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The sample size was small compared 
to the total volume of UAS operations globally. This study examined 22 accidents 
out of a potential population of hundreds of thousands.  
This study did not capture all possible interactions or overlaps; therefore, 
this should be addressed in future studies to ensure that any increase in the 
occurrence frequency is accurately reflected in both the risk value and the 
quantifying effect. The generalizability of applying the UAS STAMP CONOPS 
and the UCA themes may be repeated in future studies to assess further if this 
method is a reliable and practical method for identifying leading indicators and a 
successful model for a quantum safety metrics program. 
 
Recommendations 
The International aviation standards published by ICAO, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration both recommend maintaining a formal safety management 
system focusing on the safety assurance function. These SMS should include a clear 
focus on accident and incident reporting forms. There is abundant guidance 
material available that describes what components are necessary for an effective 
SMS and how one should be implemented. This study revealed that it is possible to 
identify and quantify unsafe control acts that lead to an accident, incident, or loss. 
Therefore, UAS organizations with a formal SMS should consider building a 
quantum safety metrics program. A quantum safety metrics program relies on 
applying the STAMP [or similar process map] and the Sierra Scale to provide a 
total APE-R and APE-P measure, which may be monitored and compared to the 
benchmark APE as part of the safety assurance function.  
 
Conclusions 
This study found that it is both plausible and practical to implement a 
bespoke quantum safety metrics program for a UAS CONOPS. This was achieved 
by extending the Accident Prevention Effort (APE and Sierra Scale) equation 
presented in this study. In addition to the basic APE and Sierra Scale, the 
researchers used previously validated methods including HFACS (to classify 
human error), and STAMP (to visual risk vectors). This new quantum framework 
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extended the existing APE to achieve four new outcomes: a) support leading 
indicator identification, b) calculate an accident prevention effort for safety 
programs (APE-P), and c) calculate an accident prevention effort for Risk (APE-
R), and finally, d) Calculate a total accident prevention effort as a benchmark value 
or a target (APE-BV).  
This study showed it was practical to use both HFACS and STAMP, for 
designing and quantifying predictive accident prevention efforts. Furthermore, this 
study extended the basic APE and Sierra Scale to support calculating a metric 
variance to target accident prevention efforts above a benchmark value (APE-RBV) 
for a particular type of UAS environment. Commercial UAS operations may benefit 
from implementing the quantum safety methodology presented in this study and 
gain tangible benefits from increased operational safety and a more stable 
investment return. 
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Unmanned Systems Aircraft Accident and Incident Data Sources  
 





6. UAS sighting data: a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data. Source: 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records/uas_sightings_report/  
7. Part 107 waiver data: Qualitative data. Source: 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiv
ers_issued/ 
8. UAS traffic data: Quantitative data (number of UAS registrations). 
Source: https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/#geo_list 
9. The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) UAS accident 
database 
10. FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management Policy 











Appendix Table A1 










Accident Vapor 25 Australia NSW Automated Flight Plan Waypoint 
Error caused loss of aircraft 
2. 11/1/201
7 




Surplus of battery current caused 
crash 
3. 3/1/2013 Incident MQ-9 United 
States 
Arizona Automated Flight Plan Waypoint 







California Military concerns FAA due to lack 
of flight planning 
5. 1/31/201
7 
Accident RQ-7 United 
States 






























Israel N/A Lack of deconfliction caused 







California Loss of GPS caused drift and crash 
into building 






Moving UAS while watching 
payload - nearly hit radio tower 






Moving UAS at low altitude while 
watching payload - hit pole 






Lack of deconfliction caused near 
miss with helicopter 















Controller malfunction caused 
flight stoppage 
















UAS lost link caused Return to 
Launch almost hitting a newly 
parked vehicle 






UAS forced landing into mountain 










Pilot launched and moved UAS 
forward into obstacles causing crash 






Loss of UAS GPS caused drift and 
crash into building 
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Loss of UAS GPS caused drift and 
hit pole. UAS still flyable. 




Lack of deconfliction caused 











Application of The Sierra Scale to Determine Qualifying Effect (QE) of Accident 
Prevention Effort (APE) In Risk Management Of Unsafe Control Acts Themes 
(UCATS). 
 
Unsafe Control Action Themes' 
(UCATS from total sample n 22) 
Frequenc







1.   Inadequate/untested software 2 8 16 
2.   Inadequate organizational procedures 
(maintenance) 
2 6 12 
3.   Lack of total system testing 3 10 30 
4.   Distracted/"screen bound" Remote Pilot 4 15 60 
5.   Inadequate data entry 4 15 75 
6.   Lost C2 link 4 6 24 
7.   Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test 5 9 45 
8.   Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control 
surface) testing 
7 16 23 
9.   Inadequate checklist application 8 20 160 
10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training 
all crew)  
8 20 160 
11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight) 9 20 180 
12. Inadequate checklist 10 25 125 
13. Inexperience in the operational area 10 10 100 
14. Inadequate visual observer 12 15 120 
Total Accident Prevention Effort of the sample 
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Note. Figure adapted from Adapted from: Hazards Effects Management Process (HEMP) Risk 
Assessment Matrix by J. Ahn and D. Chang (2016). 
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